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Abstract 
 
As a result of the Lisbon Treaty, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy and the newly established European External Action 
Service (EEAS) have been granted participation in the programming and manage-
ment cycle of the European Union’s (EU) instruments for development cooperation. 
This paper analyses the extent to which these reforms are likely to help or hinder the 
achievement of the primary objective of the EU’s development cooperation: the 
reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty. With the loss of 
development policy’s independent status, the underlying hypothesis of many 
representatives of the development community is that the poverty focus of EU 
development cooperation will be undermined by the emergence of a dominant 
and unchecked EEAS in the programming and management cycle of development 
cooperation instruments. This paper, however, shows that the loss of development 
policy’s independent status does not necessarily lead to a weakening of the EU’s 
commitment to poverty eradication. It is argued that if an institutional capacity is put 
in place to maintain the system of checks and balances in the programming cycle 
alive and, by consequence, to ensure that aid regulations reflect a clear focus on 
poverty eradication, development cooperation could in fact even benefit from the 
Lisbon reforms. To this end, the paper offers a set of policy recommendations for the 
institutional architecture of the EEAS. 
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1.  Introduction: a threat to poverty eradication? 
 
“[S]ecurity is the first condition for development. 
Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environ-
mental policies, should follow the same agenda. In a 
crisis there is no substitute for unity of command.”1 
(European Security Strategy, December 2003) 
 
Between 1 December 2009, when the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, and 26 July 
2010, when the Council Decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the 
European External Action Service was finally adopted, a full-fledged battle took 
place over the control of the multi-billion EU development funds. After months of 
institutional infighting, the Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisa-
tion and functioning of the EEAS granted the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the newly established diplomatic service 
participation in the programming and management cycle of instruments for 
development cooperation like the European Development Fund (EDF) and the 
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) as well as other financial instruments.2  
What will be the impact of these reforms upon the EU’s longest standing 
external policy? Without any doubt, the Lisbon Treaty has made available the means 
to transform development cooperation from an independent policy into a 
component of the EU’s wider foreign policy toolbox, placed under the strategic 
“unity of command” which the European Security Strategy envisaged back in 2003.3  
Although these reforms have been supported by the Council and the 
European Parliament4 in the name of greater consistency in the Union’s external 
action, they were strongly criticised by a number of analysts and development non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) for being contrary to the spirit of the Lisbon 
Treaty or even outright illegal.5 The reasons at the heart of such controversy have 
been nicely summarised by Dieter Frisch, former Director of the European 
                                                 
1 European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, Brussels, 
12 December 2003 [not published in the Official Journal]. 
2 Council of the European Union, “Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 Establishing 
the Organisation and Functioning of the European External Action Service”, Official Journal of 
the European Union, L 201, 3.8.2010, Art. 9. 
3 European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World, op.cit. 
4  European Parliament, “MEPs give conditional backing to EU diplomatic service”, Press 
Release, 23 March 2010. 
5  See M. Van Reisen, “Note on the legality of inclusion of aspects of EU Development 
Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance in the European External Action Service”, 
European External Policy Advisers, Brussels, 5 March 2010; and CIDSE, “Lawyers say Ashton’s 
EEAS proposal contradicts Lisbon Treaty”, Coopération Internationale pour le Développement 
la Solidarité (CIDSE), Press Release, 23 April 2010.  
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Commission’s Directorate General for Development (DG DEV): “if development 
comes out of isolation and on an equal footing with other dimensions of foreign 
relations, it would be positive, but if it is eaten up, it would be a disaster”.6  
The main concern for those ringing the alarm bell is the incommensurable 
differences between foreign policy and development policy. First, in terms of interests 
and objectives at stake: it is alleged that foreign policy-makers, whose primary 
objective is to safeguard the interests of European citizens, cannot be responsible for 
development policy, which is about promoting the interests of people in developing 
countries.7 Second, in terms of working methods and timeframes: James Mackie from 
the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) argues that 
“the usually short timeframes in which many foreign policy actions operate are at 
odds with the longer timeframes necessary for sustainable development”.8 In a large 
foreign service, where staff are moved around without recognition of the specialised 
nature of development cooperation, Mackie observes, the quality of programming is 
adversely affected.9  
The underlying hypothesis is that the loss of development policy’s indepen-
dent status poses a threat to the EU’s commitment to poverty eradication, in spite of 
the primacy the Treaty accords to it. This paper analyses the extent to which the 
participation of the EEAS in the development policy process, and especially in 
programming, is likely to help or hinder the achievement of the primary objective of 
the EU's development cooperation: the reduction and, in the long term, the 
eradication of poverty.  
To critically assess the above hypothesis, the paper first analyses the provisions 
of the Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the EEAS, it then vivisects the 
development policy process into its main components and looks closely at the 
decision-making process for the Financial Perspectives, aid regulations and 
programming in the pre- and Lisbon set-ups. This enables us to conduct a forward-
looking scenario exercise about the influence of the EEAS over the development 
policy process, and the extent to which it is likely to hinder the objective of poverty 
                                                 
6 Friends of Europe, “Is EU Development Aid Entering a New Era in the Wake of the Lisbon 
Treaty?”,  Report of the First Development Policy Forum, Bibliothèque Solvay, Brussels, 26 
February 2008. 
7 Simon Stocker in D. Cronin, “Development: EU Playing Aid Politics with Aid Policy”, Inter Press 
Service, 30 March 2010, retrieved 16 April 2010, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=50848. 
8 J. Mackie, H. Baser, J. Frederiksen and O. Hasse, “Ensuring that Development Cooperation 
Matters in the New Europe”, Maastricht, European Centre for Development Policy 
Management, October 2003, p. 11. 
9 Ibid., p. 18. 
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eradication by affecting existing poverty allocation criteria for Official Development 
Assistance (ODA), adherence to the OECD-DAC definition of ODA, and the 
principles of ownership in programming. The scenario exercise is complemented by a 
set of policy recommendations.  
The paper shows that the loss of development policy’s independent status 
does not necessarily lead to a weakening of the EU’s commitment to poverty 
eradication and that there are a number of safeguards that can prevent a scenario 
in which a dominant EEAS would undermine the objective of poverty eradication. If 
an institutional capacity is put in place to maintain the system of checks and 
balances in the programming cycle and, by consequence, to ensure that aid 
regulations reflect a clear focus on poverty eradication, development cooperation 
could in fact even benefit from the Lisbon reforms. 
 
2.  The EEAS’s role in development cooperation 
 
With the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the long-coveted idea of bringing together 
the different EU’s external action instruments in a unity of command seems to have 
come true. With the adoption of the Council Decision establishing the functioning 
and organisation of the EEAS on 26 July 2010,10 the new service will in fact have 
responsibility over the EU’s civilian and military crisis management capabilities, EU 
delegations and special representatives and, more importantly, the purse strings of 
development cooperation. 
By the parsimonious letter of the Lisbon Treaty, the EEAS is mandated to assist 
the High Representative in fulfilling his or her mandate.11 The Presidency report of 
October 2009 explicitly left the responsibility for trade and development to the 
relevant Commissioners and DGs of the Commission, but it indicated that the EEAS 
should play a leading role in strategic decision-making and thus be involved in the 
whole programming chain for development cooperation instruments through the 
creation of single geographical and thematic desks.12  
In the first months of 2010, the role of the EEAS in programming development 
cooperation instruments soon became one of the major bones of contention. In 
                                                 
10 Council of the European Union, “Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 Establishing 
the Organisation and Functioning of the European External Action Service”, op.cit. 
11 European Union, “Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union of 13 December 2007”, op.cit., Art. 20 TEU. 
12 European Council, Presidency report to the European Council on the European External 
Action Service, 14930/09, Brussels, 23 October 2009. 
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early March 2010, Catherine Ashton circulated vision papers outlining three possible 
scenarios for the EEAS’s involvement in the programming cycle:13 
•  a horizontal model with the EEAS responsible for resource allocation only and the 
Commission responsible for regional and national programming and implemen-
tation; 
•  a horizontal model with the EEAS responsible for resource allocation as well as 
regional and national programming and the Commission responsible for 
implementation; 
•  a vertical model, with the Commission responsible for all stages of programming 
for the EDF, and the EEAS responsible for all stages of programming for the DCI. 
 
The vertical model was rapidly discarded as anachronistic. It would have in 
fact perpetuated the artificial institutional divide between African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) countries, under the EDF, and the rest of developing countries, under 
the DCI.14 In the discourse over the EEAS, the imperative of avoiding duplication, 
inefficiency and wasteful use of resources, and that of making the EEAS an ambitious 
tool for the Union’s external action, won the hearts and minds of the European 
Parliament.15 
The draft proposal for a Council Decision on the EEAS of 25 March 2010 was 
based on the second option, a horizontal model with the EEAS being responsible for 
resource allocation as well as regional and national programming, leaving the 
Commission responsible for implementation. 16  The historic significance of this 
proposal was shadowed by the even greater controversies stirred by the 
presentation of an EEAS organigramme. Before the Foreign Affairs Council and 
General Affairs Council of 26 and 27 April 2010, to win over the staunchest opponents 
to a French-style EEAS built around a powerful secretary general, Ashton withdrew 
                                                 
13 “Member states and EU Commission clash over diplomatic service”, EUobserver, 2 March 
2010. 
14  M. Gavas and E. Koeb, “Setting up the European External Action Service: Building a 
Comprehensive Approach to EU External Action”, Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and 
European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), 16 March 2010, p. 6. 
15  European Parliament, “MEPs give conditional backing to EU diplomatic service”, Press 
Release, 23 March 2010. 
16   Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Council Decision Establishing the 
Organisation and Functioning of the European External Action Service, [not published in the 
Official Journal of the European Union], Art. 8(4). 
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the organigramme.17 Nonetheless, the responsibility of the EEAS in programming 
development instruments remained unchallenged and was finally engraved in the 
Council decision on the EEAS of 26 July 2010.  
           
Contrary to a more restrictive interpretation which would see the EEAS’s scope 
limited to the domain of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the 
Council decision on the establishment of the EEAS mandates the new service with 
the task of assisting the High Representative also in her capacity as Vice-President of 
the Commission,18 and it creates single geographical desks under her authority. 
In addition, the decision grantes the EEAS competence to contribute, jointly 
with the relevant Commission services, to the programming and management cycle 
for several geographic and thematic instruments, including the EDF and the DCI,19 
and responsibility for the preparation of country allocation, country and regional 
strategic papers and national and regional indicative programmes. Significantly, the 
decision extends to the EEAS also the responsibility for preparing proposals on the 
basic regulations for the EDF and the DCI.20 The most significant passages of the 
Council Decision establishing the EEAS, Article 9, state: 
3. In particular, the EEAS shall contribute to the programming and 
management cycle for the instruments referred to in paragraph 2, on the basis 
of the policy objectives set out in those instruments. It shall have responsibility 
for preparing the following decisions of the Commission regarding the 
strategic, multiannual steps within the programming cycle:  
(i) country allocations to determine the global financial envelope for each 
region, subject to the indicative breakdown of the multiannual financial 
framework. Within each region, a proportion of funding will be reserved for 
regional programmes;  
(ii) country and regional strategic papers;  
(iii) national and regional indicative programmes.  
In accordance with Article 3, throughout the whole cycle of programming, 
planning and implementation of the instruments referred to in paragraph 2, 
the High Representative and the EEAS shall work with the relevant members 
and services of the Commission without prejudice to Article 1(3). All proposals 
for decisions will be prepared by following the Commission’s procedures and 
will be submitted to the Commission for adoption.  
 
4. With regard to the European Development Fund and the Development 
Cooperation Instrument, any proposals, including those for changes in the 
basic regulations and the programming documents [emphasis added] 
referred to in paragraph 3, shall be prepared jointly by the relevant services in 
                                      
ton presents new architecture for EU diplomati
25 April 2010, http://www.euractiv.com/en/fore
17  “Ash c service”, EurActiv, 23 April 2010, 
retrieved  ign-affairs/ashton-presents-new-
architecture-eu-diplomatic-service-news-473058.  
18 Council of the European Union, “Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 Establishing 
the Organisation and Functioning of the European External Action Service”, op.cit. 
19 Ibid., Art. 9. 
20 Ibid. 
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the EEAS and in the Commission under the responsibility of the Commissioner 
responsible for Development Policy and shall be submitted jointly with the High 
Representative for adoption by the Commission.  
To grasp the full implications of these provisions and observe whether they are 
likely to help or hinder the EU development policy’s objective of poverty eradication, 
e vivisect the development policy process and analyse what influence the EEAS will 
ps. 




n that of developing countries. Below we briefly summarise 
Nevertheless, geographical proximity and historical links play an important role in 
determining European aid allocation to different regions with the member states 
                                                
w




The objective of poverty eradication was embraced by the European Community in 
2000 and later enshrined in the European Consensus on Development of 2005 and 
the Lisbon Treat
nsus embodied in the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs).  
Building upon the methodology of the 2015-Watch Report of Alliance 2015,22 
we measure the poverty-focus of the EU development policy by looking at 
parameters like the volume of ODA, the inclusion of poverty eradication and of 
policy coherence for development (PCD) into primary law and development policy 
documents, the existence of poverty allocation criteria for ODA such as standard 
and objective criteria for aid distribution between countries which take into acc
ecial needs of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), adherence to the 
OECD-DAC definition of ODA, and the principles of ownership in programming. 
This biggest concern inherent to the EEAS’s responsibility over aid regulations 
and programming is the risk of development funds being distorted to serve the EU’s 
self-interest rather tha
some examples of EU interests which are likely to encroach upon the objective of 
poverty eradication:  
•  Geopolitical interests: As opposed to other donors, the EU spreads its aid more 
evenly, and does not make strategic alliance a criterion for disbursements. 
 
21   European Parliament, Council of the European Union, European Commission, “Joint 
declaration by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States 
meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on the 
development policy of the European Union entitled ‘The European Consensus’”, Official 
Journal of the European Union, C 46, Brussels, 24 February 2006. 
22 Alliance 2015, “2015-Watch Methodology and Scoring System”, retrieved 25 January 2010, 
http://www.alliance2015.org/index.php?id=55. 
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competing for the agenda.23 Since the early 1990s, European Community (EC) 
aid has been re-oriented from Africa to the East as a result of declining interest in 
Africa and growing interest in the neighbourhood following the end of the Cold 
War,24 and the prospect of eventual integration into the Union.25  
•  Geo-economic and commercial interests, especially “in an era of heightened 
geo-economic competition”,26 are likely to play a growing role. Some authors, for 
example, allege that the EU exploited aid to pursue trade-related interests when 
branding European Development Fund (EDF) resources as a “sweetener” to force 
ACP countries to sign the Economic and Partnership Agreements (EPAs) in 2007.27  
•  Securitisation refers to the use of development funds for crisis management and 
conflict prevention. Textbook examples are the 9th EDF funding to the African 
Peace Facility, the EU support to African Union peace operations or alleged 
cases of development funds being used for counter-terrorism purposes by the 
local government.28  
•  Political conditionality, whether negative or positive, adds another element of 
flexibility to the measurable and objective criteria of resource allocation to 
developing countries.  
•  Visibility leads development or humanitarian aid to look for high-profile crises or 
countries while neglecting equally deserving alternatives, and can also be a 
motive for hijacking resources destined to development within the same country. 
An example is the 2008-2013 CSP for Brazil which allocated 70% of resources to 
the priority of ‘enhancing bilateral relations’, funding institutional and civil society 
exchanges, and a European Studies Institute to raise the EU’s profile in Brazil.29  
                                                 
23 Northern member states are usually more generous with Eastern Europe, whereas Italy and 
Spain prefer maintaining a balance with the Mediterranean, Spain insists also on cooperation 
with Latin America; Africa remains a priority for France and the United Kingdom; Least 
Developed Countries for Scandinavian donors, in M.Van Reisen, EU ‘Global Player’: the North-
South policy of the European Union, Utrecht, International Books, 1999, p. 37. 
24 G.R. Olsen, “Challenges to Traditional Policy Options, Opportunities for New Choices: the 
Africa policy of the EU”, The Round Table, 93:375, 2004, p. 428. 
25 European Think-Tanks Group, “New Challenges, New Beginnings: Next Steps in European 
Development Cooperation”, February 2010, p. 84. 
26 P.  Holden,  In Search of Structural Power: EU Aid Policy as a Global Political Instrument, 
Aldershot, Ashgate, 2009, p. 182. 
27 Ibid. 
28 See European Parliament Committee on Development, Report of the European Parliament 
Committee on Development on the Assessment of Draft Country and Regional Strategy 
Papers/Indicative Programmes, retrieved 25 April 2010, http://www.asia-programming.eu/ 
wcm/dmdocuments/DEVE%20conclusions%20Philippines.pdf. 
29 European Parliament, Resolution on the Draft Commission Decisions establishing Country 
Strategy Papers and Indicative Programmes for Malaysia, Brazil and Pakistan, op.cit. 
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•  Control of migration is another self-interested reason to impinge on development 
aid. The DCI, under its thematic programmes, provides for support of third 
countries to ensure better control of migration flows.30 The same goes for the EDF, 
which Concorde fears might be used to foster legislation to control illegal 
migration, a core concern for the EU31.   
 
Development policy is one of the few policy domains where the EU can draw 
on the power of the purse, a financial muscle upon which other interests and policies 
are naturally bound to impinge, as the examples above have shown. A degree of 
incoherence is unavoidable as long as different agendas, interests and objectives 
coexist within a wider EU foreign policy. However, the process of institutional 
engineering triggered by the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty might tilt the balance in 
favour of one or another of these objectives, to the detriment of poverty eradication.  
To observe whether the EEAS’s responsibility over aid regulations and 
programming will help or hinder the objective of poverty eradication, we divide the 
development policy process into seven distinct phases: legal framework, 
development policy documents, financial framework, aid regulation, programming, 
implementation, and evaluation (see Figure 1). Our research touches upon the legal 
framework and the development policy documents only when relevant to the 
discourse, and it is deliberately not extended to implementation and evaluation as 
we deemed the information too scarce at the time of writing. A full analysis will only 
be possible after the 2013 round of programming will be completed.  
Our main focus is therefore on the Financial Perspectives, the aid regulation 
and programming of Country/Region Strategy Papers for the EDF and DCI. The EDF 
and DCI have been selected because these two are explicit development 
instruments and, as the examples show, are most likely to be instrumentalised for 
objectives other than poverty eradication.  
After observing the decision-making process for these key elements and 
determining who does what at each stage of the development policy process in the 
                                                 
30 Council of the European Union, “Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 18 December 2006 establishing a financing instrument for development 
cooperation”, Official Journal of the European Union, L 378/41, Brussels, 27 December 2006, 
Article 16.  
31  Concorde, “The Revision of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement”, Concorde Cotonou 
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pre-Lisbon set-up, we explore the role of the EEAS in the new set-up and then 
conduct a forward-looking scenario-exercise about development policy in the 
Lisbon context.  
The continuously evolving nature of the subject generates a knowledge gap. 
At the time of writing the structuring of the EEAS is still on-going, and the reshuffling of 
Commission services has not been completed either. To fill the gap, the scenarios are 
based on interviews with officials from the European Commission, the European 
Parliament, the General Secretariat of the Council, representatives of the member 
states, and development practitioners, conducted between February and May 2010. 
 
Figure 1:  Seven phases of the development policy process 
 
Source: author’s compilation 
 
4.  The EU development policy process 
 
4.1   Financial Perspectives 
The Financial Framework or Financial Perspective is a multi-annual spending plan 
that translates the Union’s policy priorities into financial terms.32 It is negotiated and 
adopted by the “Budget Authority”, the Council and the European Parliament, upon 
a proposal from the Commission.  
For the 2007-2013 Financial Perspective, the Prodi Commission suggested a 
simplified external action architecture based on six instruments33 in which a number 
                                                 
32 European Commission, Financial Programming and Budget: Glossary, retrieved on 2 
October 2010, http://ec.europa.eu/budget/other_main/glossary_en.htm 
33 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament: Building our Common Future: Policy Challenges and 
Budgetary Means of the Enlarged Union 2007-2013, op.cit. 
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of geographical and thematic instruments would be merged into a “catch-all” 
economic development and cooperation instrument (EDCI) which was to cover 
developmental, environmental and security issues,34 not only vis-à-vis developing but 
also industrialised countries. The proposal also foresaw the so-called “budgetisation” 
of the EDF, its integration into the EDCI, and therefore into the EU budget, which the 
Commission had for a long time advocated.35 The EDF was at the time (and still is) 
intergovernmentally run by EU member states and administered by the European 
Commission on their behalf.  
In the end, the Commission’s proposal was pulled apart by the member states 
which ruled out the EDF’s “budgetisation”, and by the European Parliament’s 
Committee on Development that struggled to give the EDCI a more purely 
developmental focus.36 As a result, the EDCI was replaced by the DCI, based on Art. 
179 of the Nice Treaty, with a more developmental focus, and the EDF remained 
outside the EU budget. 
The impact of the EEAS on the next Financial Perspective is rather incidental. 
Looking ahead to 2014, it remains to be seen whether the more ambitious 
international profile of the new Lisbon set-up will be matched with enhanced 
financial means. The risk is that the establishment of the EEAS will not be “budget 
neutral” and the competition for scarce resources, especially in times of economic 
crisis, will go to the detriment of development objectives.  
The number of instruments itself can be another matter of concern. Holden 
argues that a consolidation of existing instruments would make them more flexible37 
as consolidated instruments tend to have larger and more catch-all objectives 
resulting in looser poverty commitments. Following this argument, it is feared that the 
poverty focus of the EDF might be at risk if it would be integrated into the EU budget 
where funds have a greater potential to be captured by differing priorities.38 The EDF 
b u d g e t i s a t i o n  i s  l i k e l y  t o  b e  b a c k  o n  t h e  a g e n d a  f o r  n e g o t i a t i o n s  o v e r  t h e  n e x t  
Financial Perspective.  
 
                                                 
34 Holden, op.cit., p. 173. 
35 European  Commission,  Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament: Towards the full integration of co-operation with ACP countries in the 
EU budget, COM(2003) 0590 final, Brussels, 8 October 2010.   
36 Holden, op.cit., p. 174. 
37 Ibid. 
38 European Think-Tanks Group, op.cit., p. 65. 
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4.2 Aid  Regulation 
 
Whereas the negotiations within the Budget Authority set the Financial Framework 
ceiling for the external action heading and its internal repartition, the aid regulation 
adopted for each instrument determines the specific objectives and scope as well 
as criteria for country allocation and resources for thematic programmes.  
 
4.2.1  Drafting the aid regulation 
The DCI has been adopted under co-decision. Negotiations for the successor 
instruments to the DCI and European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 
(EIDHR) are likely to start in 2011. By then, according to the Council Decision of 26 
July 2010,39 which extends to the EEAS responsibility for the preparation of any 
proposal and programming document, we may expect the new service to play a 
key role in the drafting of the successor instrument. A senior administrator of the 
European Parliament’s Committee on Development foresees the possibility of friction 
and lengthy negotiations with the Committee, as it was the case for the DCI 
regulation before it entered into force in 2007, if the EEAS would gain the upper 
hand.40 
As opposed to the DCI, the EDF is regulated by an international agreement 
between the EU and the ACP countries, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, and 
an internal agreement between EU member states establishing a multi-annual 
framework for contributions which runs parallel to the EU budget instruments. The last 
such agreement, referred to as 10th EDF, runs from 2008 to 2013.41 The Cotonou 
Agreement (2000-2020) is reviewed every five years. The Commission negotiated the 
2005 and 2010 reviews on behalf of the EU.42 Based on the 2010 review calendar, we 
can expect negotiations for the 2015 review to take place between May 2014 and 
                                                 
39 Council of the European Union, “Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 Establishing 
the Organisation and Functioning of the European External Action Service”, op.cit. 
40 Interview with a Senior administrator, Committee on Development, European Parliament, 
Brussels, 4 May 2010. 
41  “Internal Agreement between the Representatives of the Governments of the Member 
States, meeting within the Council, on the financing of Community aid under the multiannual 
financial frame work for the period 2008 to 2013 in accordance with the ACP-EC Partnership 
Agreement and on the al location of financial assistance for the Overseas Countries and 
Territories to which Part Four of the EC Treaty applies”, Official Journal of the European Union, 
L 247/32, Brussels, 9 September 2006. 
42  “EU-ACP agreement on the second revision of the Cotonou Agreement”, Presidencia 
Espagnola, documents and videos, 19 March 2010, retrieved 28 April 2010, 
http://www.eu2010.es/en/documentosynoticias/noticias/mar19cotonu.html 
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May 2015.43 By then, the EU will have a fully-fledged EEAS which could take up the 
negotiations with the ACP countries.  
 
4.2.2 Objectives 
The objective of poverty eradication is central to both the DCI and EDF. Poverty 
eradication is the primary and overarching goal of cooperation under the DCI. This 
objective is translated into a commitment to make 100% of the geographic 
programmes and a minimum of 90% of the thematic programmes ODA-eligible. 
Despite this provision, however, DCI programming documents in several cases 
lacked a clear focus on poverty eradication and the MDGs.44  
Cooperation under the EDF is centred on the objective of reducing, and 
eventually eradicating, poverty consistent with the objectives of sustainable 
development and the gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world 
economy.45 The Internal Agreement for the 10th EDF called for the largest extent 
possible of its resources to be ODA-eligible.46 Nonetheless, the EDF remains flexible 
enough to finance activities which are not ODA-eligible. 
The 2005 Cotonou Agreement review confirmed the strong poverty-oriented 
focus of the cooperation, with an additional reference to the MDGs in the preamble 
and the annexes, but at the same time enlarged the scope of the partnership to less 
strictly developmental issues like proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,47 the 
International Criminal Court, 48 and the fight against international terrorism and 
mercenary activities,49 a tendency that could be supported by an EEAS prone to 
exert the EU’s political influence. 
 
                                                 
43  “Preparation negotiating mandate (late 2008), approval mandates in February 2009, 
notification of areas for change to other party in February 2009, two months to react and add 
related issues, negotiations: May 2009 – May 2010, signing during 2010 Joint ACP-UE Council of 
Ministers”, in Geert Laporte, “The 2010 Review of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement”, power 
point presentation, Maastricht, ECDPM, 19 May 2009, retrieved 23 April 2010, 
http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/1D8D914408FAA0F0C12
575F60032C640/$FILE/ECSC%20Revision%20Cotonou%202010.ppt 
44 European Think-Tanks Group, op.cit., p. 54. 
45 European  Community  and ACP Group of States, Agreement Amending the EC-ACP 
Partnership Agreement Signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, Luxembourg, 25 June 2005, Title I, 
Art. 1. 
46 Interview with Domenico Rosa, DG Development, European Commission, 16 March 2010. 
47  European Community and ACP Group of States, Agreement Amending the EC-ACP 
Partnership Agreement signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, op.cit., Art. 11. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
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4.2.3  Criteria for country allocation  
For the DCI, it is the regulation itself that establishes, through a process of political 
negotiation, the repartition of resources between thematic and geographic 
programmes. For the EDF, it is the internal agreement between EU member states 
that allocates resources between national, regional and intra-ACP programmes. 
When it comes to resource allocation between countries, the 2005 European 
Consensus on Development establishes that standard, objective and transparent 
resource allocation criteria, based on needs and performance, shall guide the 
allocation.50 This requirement is translated into the DCI regulation and into Annex IV 
of the Cotonou Agreement, which lists a number of criteria to define needs and 
performance.  
DG DEV uses an algorithm to break down the total envelope based on 
standard criteria like the size of the population and income per capita. The principles 
guiding EDF programming also provide for special treatment to be accorded to 
LDCs as well as islands and landlocked countries, which can amount to increases on 
the baseline of 5% and 10% respectively.51  
The DCI regulation included from its inception conflict sensitivity as one of the 
needs criterion. For the EDF, it was the 2005 review that introduced a provision 
whereby “account shall be taken of the particular difficulties of countries dealing 
with the aftermath of conflict or natural disaster”.52  
With regard to performance, a difference exists between objective criteria like 
economic and social performance, which are all based on measurable indicators, 
and political performance, which is of a more qualitative nature. The DCI regulation 
took good governance into account from the beginning, whereas for the ACP 
countries, it was only the 10th EDF that introduced a specific incentive tranche based 
on governance performance.53 Additionally, the 2005 Cotonou review introduced 
provisions to increase a country’s or region’s allocation “in order to take account of 
special needs or exceptional performance”.54 Once again, it is likely that an EEAS 
                                                 
50 European Parliament, Council of the European Union, European Commission, The European 
Consensus, op.cit., point 64. 
51 Interview with Domenico Rosa, DG Development, European Commission, 16 March 2010. 
52 European Community, ACP Group of States, Agreement Amending the EC-ACP Partnership 
Agreement signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, Luxembourg, 25 June 2005, Annex IV, Art. 3. 
53 Interview with Domenico Rosa, DG Development, European Commission, 16 March 2010. 
54 European Community, ACP Group of States, Agreement Amending the EC-ACP Partnership 
Agreement signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, Luxembourg, 25 June 2005, Annex IV. 
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prone to exercise a more political role will make more frequent use of these 
instruments. 
4.3 Thematic  Programmes 
 
Thematic programmes are by nature more flexible than their geographical counter-
parts. To accommodate this demand for more flexibility, the DCI regulation allows for 
u p  t o  1 0 %  o f  i t s  t h e m a t i c  p r o g r a m m e s  t o  b e  n o n - O D A  e l i g i b l e . 55 A similar case 
applies to the intra-ACP envelope of the 9th EDF, which critics described as a pocket 
to finance activities which reflected newly emerged EU priorities, like the Joint Africa 
Europe Strategy (JAES)56 or the African Peace Facility (APF).57 On top of that, the 
intra-ACP envelope under the 9th EDF was not programmed, thus undermining the 
principle of ownership.58 With the 10th EDF, the intra-ACP envelope is programmed by 
the Commission and the ACP Committee of Ambassadors in Brussels. It is likely that 
programming the intra-ACP envelope for the successor to the 10th EDF might be 
affected by the participation of the EEAS, which is likely to be more sensitive than DG 
DEV to pressures coming especially from member states to use thematic 
programmes for EU priorities beyond development. 
 
4.4 Programming 
Programming translates the objectives of the aid regulations into strategic objectives 
of cooperation with a given country or region. The programming cycle determines 
the final allocations per country as well as between focal sectors, based on the 
criteria set out by the aid regulation. Programming is the most important as well as 
the most ‘vulnerable’ stage of the development policy process.  
The 2008-2013 round of programming provides an array of examples of how 
resources allocated to development cooperation can be instrumentalised to 
promote objectives other than poverty eradication. For instance, the initial draft CSPs 
                                                 
55 Council of the European Union, Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 18 December 2006 establishing a financing instrument for development 
cooperation, op.cit. 
56  totalling 22% of the 9th EDF, in Concord, “Intra ACP-Funds”, Briefing Paper, Concorde 
Cotonou Working Group, 15-20 March 2008. 
57 European Community, ACP Group of States, Decision on the use of resources from the long-
term development envelope of the ninth EDF for the creation of a Peace Facility for Africa, 
No 3/2003, Brussels, 11 December 2003. 
58 Interview with Domenico Rosa, DG Development, European Commission, 16 March 2010. 
  17 Mario Giuseppe Varrenti 
for Bangladesh59 and the Philippines60 made explicit reference to the objective of 
fighting terrorism. The European Parliament’s Committee on Development raised 
concerns about the CSP for India which funded the Erasmus Mundus student 
exchange programme, from which European students could have benefited.61 But 
even more telling is the example of the Special Measure 2007 for Iraq which 
selected, as one area for intervention, a feasibility study for the Akkas gas field, with 
the overall objective of studying the conditions for exploration of the field and linking 
its output to the Syrian gas pipeline network, a project with a dubious link to the 
objective of poverty eradication.62  
The Council Decision of 26 July 2010 confers to the EEAS the responsibility to 
determine the global financial envelope for country and regional allocations, and to 
prepare country and regional strategy papers (CSPs, RSPs) and national and 
regional indicative programmes. Country and regional allocations are conducted 
according to criteria established by the aid regulations themselves, Regulation (EC) 
No 1905/2006 for the DCI, and Annex IV of the Cotonou Agreement for EDF. 
CSPs/RSPs have been the common framework for the management of the 
EU’s external cooperation programmes since 2000. CSP/RSPs contain strategic 
assessments of the political and economic situation of a country or region for five to 
seven years and general lines for the intended response.63 CSPs are the framework 
for both EDF and DCI. Although this has brought a degree of administrative 
harmonisation between the two instruments,64 substantial differences continue to 
persist: 
•  EDF programming is a joint exercise with the partner countries and consultation 
with the local authorities and non-state actors is obligatory, whereas for DCI 
programming is only a policy prescription; 
                                                 
59European Parliament Committee on Development, 'Abstract - Bangladesh, Report on the 
Assessment of Draft Country and Regional Strategy Papers/Indicative Programmes, Brussels, 
2006,http://www.asia-programming.eu/wcm/dmdocuments/DEVE%20conclusions%20 
Bangladesh.pdf. 
60 European Parliament Committee on Development, 'Abstract – Philippines’ Report on the 
Assessment of Draft Country and Regional Strategy Papers/Indicative Programmes, Brussels, 
2006, http://www.asia-programming.eu/wcm/dmdocuments/DEVE%20conclusions%20 
Philippines.pdf. 
61  European  Parliament  Committee on Development, 'Abstract - India, Report on the 
Assessment of Draft Country and Regional Strategy Papers/Indicative Programmes, Brussels, 
2006.  
62  European Parliament, “Resolution of 25 October 2007 on the draft Commission decision 
establishing a Special Measure 2007 for Iraq”, Official Journal of the European Union, 
P6_TA(2007)0481, Brussels, 25 October 2007, Art. 1. 
63 M. Gavas and E. Koeb, “Setting up the European External Action Service”, op.cit., p. 4. 
64 European Think-Tanks Group, op.cit., p. 65.  
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•  EDF programming excludes any role for the European Parliament, whereas the 
Parliament’s Committee on Development has an overview over DCI programm-
ing documents, which results in a set of suggestions and recommendations to the 
Commission, and - in cases where the Parliament estimates that the Commission 
has exceeded its implementing powers - in a parliamentary resolution requesting 
the Commission to withdraw or modify its draft decision. The Lisbon Treaty, 
however, might change the role of the European Parliament in the programming 
cycle.65 
•  Before Lisbon, DG DEV managed EDF programming, whereas DG Relex 
managed DCI programming (with the exception of South Africa). “Historically, 
DG Relex has a better track at prioritising conflict and peace issues”,66 whereas 
DG DEV is regarded as less geared to EU interests.67 This institutional divide comes 
to an end with the EEAS and the introduction of single geographic desks at head-
quarters level. 
 
Besides the differences outlines above, the preparation of CSP/RSP for both EDF 
and DCI programming followed the following eight steps in the pre-Lisbon set up:   
 
(1) Preparation of the draft CSP/RSP 
The responsibility for preparing the draft CSP/RSPs falls upon the Head of Delegation 
(HoD) and is shared with the National Authorising Officer (NAO) for EDF programm-
ing. Drafting the CSP/RSP is done in close cooperation with the geographical services 
                                                 
65  The Lisbon Treaty opened a legal quarrel between the Council and the European 
Parliament. At its heart lies a dispute on the nature of the programming documents for 
development instruments. Currently, Country and Regional Strategy Papers, the strategic 
assessments of the political and economic situation of a country or region upon which 
resources are allocated, are considered implementing acts, regulated by the Council of the 
European Union. The “Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 on laying down the 
procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission”, Official 
Journal of the European Union, L 184/23, Brussels, 17 July 1999, grants a droit de regard to the 
European Parliament, and since 2006 the right to issue declarations if it considers the 
Commission has violated its implementing power mandate, but no veto rights. On the ground 
of its new powers under Lisbon, specifically Art. 290 and Art. 291 TFEU, whereby decisions on 
implementing acts or delegated acts should be adopted under the ordinary legislative 
procedure, the European Parliament claims that Council Decision 1999/468/EC should now 
be replaced. Although it has not advanced claims over executive functions, the European 
Parliament maintains that programming documents should be considered as delegated acts 
which, according to Art. 291, can enter into force only if the European Parliament and the 
Council express no objections. Considering CSPs/RSPs as delegated acts would give the 
European Parliament a veto power in the programming cycle. 
66 Gavas, op.cit., p. 6. 
67 Holden, op.cit., p. 133. 
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at headquarters.68 At this stage, consultation with local authorities and non-state 
actors takes place. Commission DGs other than the one responsible for the 
instrument as well as AIDCO and the European Investment Bank (EIB) should be 
involved. Once ready, the draft is sent to the Director of the competent 
geographical service. 
In the post-Lisbon set up, the competence of the HoD remains unchanged, he 
continues to hold the right of initiative on the first draft of the programming 
documents, but he does so in close cooperation with the competent geographical 
desks, which are now going to be part of the EEAS. With Lisbon, the HoDs are under 
the authority of the High Representative and are therefore likely to play a more 
political role speaking on behalf of whole of the EU and not just the Commission. In 
addition, one third of the EEAS will in fact be member-state diplomats likely to be 
posted as HoDs. At this stage, the involvement of the newly established other DGs 
and AIDCO constitutes a sort of first pre-emptive “development check”.  
 
(2) Preparation of the Programming Appraisal Grid 
The geographical unit prepares a governance performance appraisal grid consisting 
of two components, the appraisal of the current government performance and the 
appraisal of the reform commitments for the next programming period. 69  The 
governance performance appraisal grid can lead to an increased allocation on 
grounds of political performance. For EDF programming this was the case after the 
introduction of the already mentioned “governance incentive tranche” with the 10th 
EDF. Governance profiles and commitments are monitored regularly, and countries’ 
allocations can be reviewed annually. 
With Lisbon, the EEAS geographical desks, which prepare the governance 
appraisal grid, could influence the decision to maintain or increase the initial 
financial allocation by an incentive tranche up to one third, a sensitive leverage vis-
à-vis the partner countries and the other DGs. It remains to be seen to which extent 
this leverage will be used to pursue other objectives of EU foreign policy. Already 
before Lisbon, access to the incentive tranche depended on the “outcome of a 
dialogue between the Commission and the partner countries on the past 
performance and future commitments in the area of governance, including on 
                                                 
68 European Commission, “10th EDF Programming Orientations: Annexe 2 – The Programming 
Process”,  Inter-quality Support Group, retrieved 15 March 2010, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
development/icenter/repository/ACP_programming_process_en.doc.  
69 Ibid. 
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migration [emphasis added]”,70 and the EEAS might speak with a stronger voice in 
this respect. 
 
(3) Country/Region Team Meetings 
The draft CSP/RSP and the governance performance appraisal grid are then 
discussed in Country/Region Team Meetings (CTM/RTM) organised by the geographi-
cal service of the DG involved. An invitation to participate in the CTM/RTM is 
extended automatically to directors of geographical and thematic units in AIDCO, 
appropriate directors in other DGs (DG DEV for DCI programming, DG Relex for EDF 
programming, Trade and ECHO for both if appropriate) and could be extended to 
directors of other DGs (e.g. Agriculture, Energy, Environment, Fisheries, etc.).71 In the 
pre-Lisbon set-up, DG Relex attended CTM/RTMs for ACP countries and vice versa 
DG DEV attended non-ACP programming meetings. In the Lisbon set-up, with the 
EEAS and DG DEV sitting at the same table, the CTM/RTM will constitute a 
“ d e v e l o p m e n t  c h e c k ”  o f  t h e  p r o g r a m m i n g  c y c l e ,  i n  w h i c h  D G  D E V  w i l l  h a v e  a n  
opportunity to verify the adherence of the document to the primary objective of EU 
development cooperation, poverty eradication, and make the case for ensuring 
policy coherence for development. 
The CTM/RTM can request substantial changes to the draft CSP/RSP, and 
based on the programming performance appraisal grid, the CTM/RTM deliberates 
on the allocation of additional resources. For EDF funds, the governance incentive 
tranche can increase the initial indicative allocation by a maximum of one third.72 
But the CTM/RTM’s main task is to ensure coherence of Community actions. At this 
stage, the CSP is enriched with contributions of all parties involved and becomes 
more of a compromise document.73 In this case, the simple presence of the EEAS in 
CTM/RTMs could offer an opportunity to ensure not only coherence, but also 
consistency of the EU’s external actions as a whole, including the domain of CFSP. In 
addition, a special unit in the EEAS will be in charge of ensuring consistency across 
policies.   
 
                                                 
70  European  Commission,  Governance and the European Consensus on Development, 
COM(2006) 735 final, Brussels, 30 November 2006.  
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Interview with an official, DG Development, European Commission, Brussels, 8 April 2010. 
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(4) Inter-Quality Support Group 
After the directives of the CTM/RTM are sent to the HoD, and the HoD, if requested, 
submitted the revised CSP/RSP to the geographical desk,74 the document is sent to 
the Inter-Quality Support Group (iQSG). “The iQSG consists of a permanent 
secretariat (three people) and a group of experts ‘borrowed’ from various 
DGs” 75 with the task of ensuring “consistency and the quality of programming 
document on the basis of the common framework for CSP/RSP adopted in 2000”.76 
Holden found that in the 2001 round of CSP/RSP programming, the iQSG was 
perceived as too developmentally oriented.77 Recent interviews with Commission 
officials revealed that the iQSG’s role is largely cosmetic, as opposed to the 
CTM/RTM which can require substantial changes to the draft CSP. 78 In theory, 
however, the iQSG screening could constitute another “development check”. 
 
(5) NIP/RIPs 
Following the CTM/RTMs and iQSG assessments, the geographical service, in 
collaboration with the HoD and AIDCO, prepares a condensed form of the National 
Indicative Programme,79 which allocates resources to each of the focal and non-
focal sectors of the CSP/RSP. The involvement of AIDCO represents here a safeguard 
against an instrumental allocation of development resources. As Simon Maxwell 
pointed out during a meeting of the Parliament’s Development Committee in March 
2010, it remains key for the Commissioner for Development to retain a sort of control 
over AIDCO in the new set-up.80 The European Think Tank Group envisaged even 
that AIDCO and DG DEV should be brought together under one single Directorate-
General.81  
 
(6) Commissioner’s validation 
In the current procedure, the Commissioner validates the proposal before this is 
transmitted a second time to the iQSG, the delegation and the NAO for a final 
                                                 
74 Ibid. 
75 Holden, op.cit., p. 40. 
76 European Commission, 10th EDF Programming Orientations, op.cit. 
77 Holden, op.cit., p. 41. 
78 Interview with an official, DG Development, European Commission, Brussels, 8 April 2010. 
79 European Commission, 10th EDF Programming Orientations, op.cit. 
80   Simon Maxwell, Director of Overseas Development Institute, “New Challenges, New 
Beginnings: Next Steps in European Development Cooperation”, Report by the European 
Think-Tanks Group, European Parliament Committee on Development, 16 March 2010. 
81 European Think-Tanks Group, op.cit. 
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comment. Once the draft is finalised and the NAO has made his comment, the 
geographical service launches an Inter-Service Consultation. The Council Decision 
on the EEAS establishes that with regard to EDF and DCI, any proposal on 
programming document should be jointly submitted for decision to the College of 
Commissioners by the Commissioner for Development and the High Representative. 
The authority of the Commissioner to sign off on the proposal creates here a so-
called “joint key”, 82  which places a further “development check” on all 
programming documents. 
 
(7) Inter-Service Consultation 
The final CSP and the NAO comments are then forwarded to AIDCO, the European 
Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO), DG Relex (if EDF), DG DEV (if DCI), DG 
TRADE and the Legal Service, which are invited to give their opinion on the 
documents. 83 At the same time, the iQSG assesses the follow-up of its original 
recommendations, and the iQSG opinion and ISC opinions are submitted by the 
same deadline.84 The Inter-Service Consultation presents a further opportunity to 
ensure that the programming documents are coherent with the objective of poverty 
eradication. 
 
(8) EDF Committee, DCI Committee, the European Parliament and approval 
After the ISC and iQSG validations, the CSP/RSP is sent to the committees where the 
member states are represented. The EDF Committee is composed of representatives 
of the member states in Brussels, it deliberates without consulting the European 
Parliament. The DCI Committee is composed of representatives of the member 
states and is chaired by a representative of the Commission.85 For DCI, the European 
Parliament is informed of the Committee proceedings on a regular basis86 and the 
Parliament’s Committee on Development, organised into five working groups 
meeting on average every fortnight, screens and analyses the draft CSR/RSPs and 
the Annual Action Programmes (AAPs). For their democratic scrutiny work, these 
working groups engage in a structured dialogue with the Commission and, if 
                                                 
82 Gavas, op.cit., p. 9. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Council of the European Union, Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 on laying down the 
procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission, op.cit., 
Art. 4 and Art. 4. 
86 Ibid., Art. 7. 
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necessary, contact embassies and civil society; their scrutiny results in a set of 
suggestions and recommendations to the Commission, and - in cases when they 
estimate that the Commission has exceeded its implementing powers - in a 
parliamentary resolution requesting the Commission to withdraw or modify its draft 
decision. Guido Van Hecken, Senior Administrator at the Development Committee's 
secretariat, pointed out that only a quarter of Parliament's requests for withdrawal or 
modification of a draft measure (3 out of 12) were taken into account during the 
past legislature (2004-2009).87  
The CSP/RSPs are finally adopted by written procedure by the Commission. 
The geographical desk prepares a notification letter from the Commissioner to the 
Head of State. The letter indicates who signs the CSP on behalf of the Commission. 
The signature marks the formal adoption of the CSP/RSP.  
Figure 2, based on the 2007 cycle of programming, represents the decision-
making process for CSP/RSP in the Lisbon set-up and help us identify the “develop-
ment checks” scattered along the process: 
•  the participation of AIDCO and possibly other DGs in the first drafting of Country 
and Regional Strategy Papers; 
•  the participation of DG DEV and other relevant DGs in CTM/RTMs with the 
opportunity to extend Policy Coherence for Development to the whole of the 
EU’s external action, including the CFSP; 
•  the “joint key”, with the Commissioner for Development having the last say in 
programming, especially for draft NIP/RIPs; 
•  the Intra-Service Consultation; 
•  the scrutiny of the European Parliament’s Committee on Development.  
 
                                                 
87 Guido Van Hecken, Secretariat of the European Parliament Committee on Development, 
“The role of the European Parliament in Development”, lecture, Bruges, 9 April 2010. EU Diplomacy Papers 10/2010 
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Figure 2: Decision-making Process for CSP/RSP 
Source: author’s compilation 
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5.  Post-Lisbon scenarios for EU development cooperation 
 
In order to help the objective of poverty eradication it is vital that development 
priorities are reflected in the instruments’ regulation. With a clear focus on poverty 
eradication and the MDGs, as well as standard and objective criteria for resource 
allocation between countries, aid regulations can set the boundaries for 
programming and prevent the diversion of development resources. Aid regulations 
can also provide watchdogs, like the Parliament’s Committee on Development, with 
a powerful tool to scrutinise the programming documents. 
If the provisions of the Council Decision on the EEAS are interpreted in an 
expansive way, we can expect the EEAS to play a dominant role in preparing 
proposals for the successor instrument to the DCI, as well as in the conduct of 
negotiations for the 2015 Cotonou review. It remains to be seen, especially 
depending on institutional capacity, to which extent the guidance of the 
Commissioner for Development will be an effective “development check” in the 
process. In any case, the EEAS might end up exercising control over the following 
levers of the aid regulations:  
•  objectives; 
•  percentage of ODA-eligible aid; 
•  proportion between geographic and thematic programmes; 
•  allocations between regions; 
•  criteria for country allocation. 
 
The EEAS will also play a central role in the programming cycle through the 
creation of single geographical desks in Brussels, and at delegation level with the 
Head of Delegation, who receives instructions primarily from the High Representative, 
holding the right of initiative for the CSR/RSPs.  
In the next section we will present two alternative scenarios, one in which the 
EEAS emerges as the dominant player in the development policy process, and 
another in which an effective dual management is put in place, thanks to the 
enforcement of checks and balances. 
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5.1  Scenario one: a dominant EEAS 
By exerting control over the HoDs through its single geographical desks, the EEAS 
could emerge as the dominant player in the programming cycle to the detriment of 
a weaker and split DG DEV. In extreme but possible cases, the HoDs drafting the 
development programming documents would be member-state diplomats posted 
to the EEAS.88 DG DEV would be relegated to a secondary role within the CTM/RTMs 
too. This way, the Development Commissioner ‘joint key’ would become little more 
than a bureaucratic practice. 
In such a scenario, programming would be severely affected by the lack of 
mechanisms to preserve development expertise within an EEAS characterised by a 
short-term focus on crisis-management and security policy. Development experts 
integrated into the EEAS would therefore end up being marginalised even at 
delegation level.89 With a weak development control over programming, resources 
destined to eradicate poverty would be used, for example, to foster legislation to 
control illegal migration, to fight terrorism, drug-trafficking or to promote the EU’s 
visibility across the world. 
This new equilibrium would be reflected in the new aid regulations prepared 
within the EEAS, with greater flexibility, broader objectives and less tight criteria for 
resource allocation between countries, resulting in a smaller allocation to LDCs to the 
benefit of geopolitically sensitive countries and the neighbourhood. The new 
regulations might be more sensitive to crisis contexts and give greater emphasis to 
political performance. More resources would be allocated to thematic programmes 
and the intra-ACP envelope, and the proportion of aid bound to be ODA-eligible 
would therefore be reduced. 
This tendency could generate momentum for a rationalisation and consolida-
tion of existing instruments in the 2014-2021 Financial Perspective. Even more 
alarmingly, the imbalance of power in programming would severely affect the 
stance of the Development Commissioner within the College of Commissioners, 
where he could become subordinated to a predominant High Representative/Vice 
President “promoting security-driven or influence-asserting politics”.90  
                                                 
88 Honor Mahony, “Member states agree diplomatic service”, EUobserver, 27 April 2010. 
89 E. Koeb, “A More Political EU external Action: Implications of the Treaty of Lisbon for th EU’s 
relations with developing countries”, Maastricht, European Centre for Development Policy 
Management, InBrief, no. 21, June 2008, p. 11. 
90 Ibid., p. 9. 
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Simon Maxwell had ironically remarked that with the EEAS’s influence over 
programming, an independent implementing agency, and a separate 
Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid, the Development Commissioner would have 
become as influential as a “director of a think-tank”.91 In the longer run, such a 
scenario would lead to the subordination of the objectives of development 
cooperation and the instrumentalisation of development funds in the name of 
greater consistency, and a weakening of the EU’s commitment to poverty 
eradication exacerbated at the international level by the likely failure to achieve the 
MDGs and widespread aid fatigue among donors. 
The provisions of the Lisbon Treaty and the Council Decision on the 
establishment of the EEAS, combined with a number of internal and external factors, 
could theoretically lead to such a scenario. Our argument, however, is that there is a 
number of safeguards which could prevent this scenario from coming into place, or 
mitigate its detrimental effects on the objective of poverty eradication.  
 
5.2  Scenario two: checks and balances 
The first safeguard of development policy’s objectives is the Lisbon Treaty itself. The 
primacy of the objective of poverty eradication is enshrined in EU primary law as well 
as the provision on policy coherence for development, unique among international 
donors. The Council Decision of 26 July 2010 clarifies, as opposed to the earlier 
proposal of 25 March 2010, that “the EEAS should seek to ensure that the 
programmes fulfil the objectives [...] of the Union’s development policy and [...] the 
European Consensus on Development”.92  
To counter the dominant role of the EEAS, the Council Decision establishing 
the EEAS provides also for a dual management of programming. “Throughout the 
whole cycle of programming, planning and implementation, [...] the High 
Representative and the EEAS shall work with the relevant members and services of 
the Commission”.93 “[W]ith regard to the European Development Fund and the 
Development Cooperation Instrument, any proposals, including those for changes in 
the basic regulations and the programming documents [...], shall be prepared jointly 
                                                 
91   Simon Maxwell, Director of Overseas Development Institute, “New Challenges, New 
Beginnings: Next Steps in European Development Cooperation”, Report by the European 
Think-Tanks Group, European Parliament Committee on Development, 16 March 2010. 
92 Council of the European Union, “Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 Establishing 
the Organisation and Functioning of the European External Action Service”, op.cit., Art. 1(4). 
93 Ibid., Art. 9(3). 
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by the relevant services in the EEAS and in the Commission under the responsibility of 
the Commissioner responsible for Development Policy and shall be submitted jointly 
with the High Representative for adoption by the Commission”.94 
The dual management is guaranteed by the existence of development 
“checks and balances” scattered along the programming cycle which act as 
balancing forces against a dominant EEAS: 
•  the participation of AIDCO and possibly other DGs in the first drafting of Country 
and Regional Strategy Papers; 
•  the participation of DG DEV and other relevant DGs in CTM/RTMs with the 
opportunity to extend Policy Coherence for Development to the whole of the 
EU’s external action, including the CFSP; 
•  the “joint key”, with the Commissioner for Development having the last say in 
programming, especially for draft NIP/RIPs; 
•  the Intra-Service Consultation which could be made more effective in promoting 
the coherence of all policies with development objectives;95  
•  the scrutiny of the European Parliament’s Committee on Development.  
 
For these checks and balances to be effective, however, it is crucial that 
development cooperation will be well represented in the policy formulation and that 
it will have the space and autonomy to develop its specialists at country level and in 
Brussels96 within the EEAS itself. With the transfer of former DG DEV services into the 
EEAS it is likely that the new diplomatic service will internalise the two cultures of the 
EU’s external relations, a communitarian culture inherited from the Commission 
services and a political culture inherited from the Council and crisis management 
structures.97 In this respect, it is vital that the developmental culture will find its 
autonomous space within the EEAS. This could be achieved through “separate 
career paths for technical development advisors in the EEAS and relevant 
Commission services”.98 
                                                 
94 Ibid., Art. 9(4). 
95   European Think Tanks Group, “Development-proofing the European External Action 
Service”, Policy Brief, June 2010. 
96 Mackie et al., op.cit., p. 11. 
97  Gavas, Mikaela and Maxwell, Simon, “Indicators of a Successful  EEAS”, Submission to 
Inquiry into the European External Action Service by Sub-Committee C of the House of Lords, 
July 2010. Available at http://internationaldevelopmenteu.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/odi-
written-evidence-on-eeas-house-of-lords-eu-sub-com-c-july2010.pdf 
98   European Think Tanks Group, “Development-proofing the European External Action 
Service”, op.cit. 
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It is also vital that the Commissioner for Development will have effective 
instruments under his supervision and guidance for the services in the EEAS which will 
be involved in the programming cycle, either by establishing a direct line of reporting 
from the EEAS geographical desks dealing with developing countries or in a 
hypothetical development department within the EEAS. The latter is an option which 
would be in line with the letter of the Council Decision on the EEAS. 
With regard to the Commission services responsible for programming, the 
establishment of the EEAS has paved the way for the merging of AIDCO and the 
leftovers of DG DEV into a newly established EuropeAid Development Cooperation 
Office (DEVCO), a decision announced on 27 October 2010. 99 Within this new 
Directorate-General, we can assume that the leftover services of DG DEV would 
remain responsible for thematic programming, under the guidance of the 
Commissioner for Development, as provided for by the Council Decision on the 
establishment of the EEAS.100 This will ensure a poverty focus in thematic programmes 
which now seem to be the most vulnerable to “instrumentalisation”. At the same 
time, deprived of its geographical services, and the burden of political dialogue 
which is taken over by the EEAS, the leftovers services of DG DEV will become more 
focused and specialised in cross-cutting and thematic issues. This would enhance the 
newly established DEVCO’s institutional capacity and transform it into a sort of 
watchdog in support for PCD, especially within the CTM/RTMs. DEVCO would thus 
also be influential in the preparation of the successor to the DCI, and in the 
negotiations of the 2015 Cotonou review. The draft decision on the EEAS does not in 
fact rule out the possibility that proposals on aid regulations are prepared by 
Commission services, and not just the EEAS.101 
With regard to AIDCO, after Lisbon, the implementing agency started to 
report to the Commissioner for Development instead of the no longer existing 
Commissioner for External Relations. This paved the way for the merging of AIDCO 
and DG DEV into a newly established DEVCO. With such an institutional capacity 
behind him, the Commissioner for Development would develop a visible and 
autonomous role within the College of Commissioners and be able to make an 
effective use of the joint key when signing off the programming documents. 
                                                 
99  Taylor, Simon and Vogel, Toby, “EEAS Appointments Trigger Mini-Reshuffle”, European 
Voice, 28 October 2010. 
100 Council of the European Union, “Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 Establishing 
the Organisation and Functioning of the European External Action Service”, op.cit., Art. 9(4). 
101 Ibid. 
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The Development Commissioner and the services under his authority could 
also exploit the ‘window of opportunity’ offered by the institutional reform process to 
embrace the full breath of developing countries, putting an end to the divide 
between ACP and non-ACP developing countries - what Eva Joly, Chairwoman of 
the Parliament’s Committee on Development, has defined as archaic and 
colonial,102 and Mirjam Van Reisen as a systematic violation of the policy definition of 
developing cooperation.103 
Another “development check” will come into being if the European 
Parliament wins the battle over the nature of the programming documents and 
secures a veto power over CSP/RSPs. In addition, if the EDF is budgetised, this will 
mean full parliamentary oversight over programming documents for both DCI and 
EDF. The Parliament’s Committee on Development would thus hold the fifth 
“development check” over the programming cycle. 
 
5.3 Policy  recommendations 
As the second scenario shows, not only does the Lisbon Treaty offer the chance of 
helping the objective of poverty reduction, but also that “of capitalising on the entire 
breath of external action for the benefit of development”.104 The scenarios have also 
shown that for this opportunity to be seized, it is vital that development cooperation 
is well represented in policy formulation and that it has the space and autonomy to 
develop its specialists within and without the EEAS.105 In other words, it is key to 
develop an institutional capacity that maintains the system of checks and balances 
of the programming cycle alive, and by consequence, ensures that aid regulations 
reflect a clear focus on poverty eradication. We offer here two sets of policy 
recommendations for the institutional architecture to seize these chances provided 
by the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
(1) Organisation models 
Advocates of development policy’s independence usually take as a model those 
member states with an independent development minister and an independent 
development office responsible for the whole programming cycle (UK, Germany, 
                                                 
102   Interview with Eva Joly, Chairwoman of the European Parliament Committee on 
Development, Brussels, 4 May 2010. 
103 Van Reisen, Window of Opportunity, op.cit., p. 256. 
104 Koeb, op.cit., p. 13. 
105 Mackie et al., op.cit., p. 11. 
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Sweden).106 With Lisbon, a similar model built around a strong DG DEV is defunct and 
replaced by a “dual-management” system. In a dual-management system, the two 
main actors will be the EEAS and the Commission services.  
Within the Commission services, the merger of AIDCO and DG DEV into a new 
DEVCO is likely to lead to a heavier counterpart to the EEAS. However, we 
recommend to take advantage of the institutional engineering process triggered by 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in order to ensure that development priorities 
are well represented within the EEAS itself. This can be achieved in two ways: 
•  either with the creation of a development department within the EEAS, under the 
authority of the Commissioner for Development and financially accountable to 
the European Parliament; or 
•  with the establishment of a management structure in which the Commissioner for 
Development has under his supervision and direct guidance the development 
practitioners within several EEAS geographical desks or the whole of the EEAS 
geographical desks dealing with developing countries, ACP or non-ACP.  
 
(2) Division of labour 
The greatest ‘added value’ of the new set-up and its dual-management structure is 
the opportunity to end the rigid institutional divide of the pre-Lisbon architecture and 
replace it with a flexible and dynamic division of labour which combines the 
complementary added values of the Commission and the Council. We recommend 
that the Commissioner for Development, and the services under his authority, should 
take the lead in programming of aid for developing countries and LDCs, both ACP 
and non-ACP. The High Representative and the services under her authority should 
instead take the lead in the following scenarios: 
•  fragile states where the EU is engaged in crisis management. In places where a 
conflict or crisis undermines the authority of the local government, the Cotonou 
Agreement allows the Commission to manage the resources itself for special 
support, including peace-building policies, conflict management and resolution 
and post-conflict support.107 This responsibility could be assumed by the EEAS and 
the High Representative. It would be best suited to ensure more conflict sensitivity 
                                                 
106 Koeb, op.cit., p. 9. 
107  European Community and ACP Group of States, Agreement Amending the EC-ACP 
Partnership Agreement signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, op.cit., Annex IV, Art. 4. 
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and a so-called ‘whole-of-government’ approach and at the same time avoid 
wasteful duplication; 
•  emerging countries, which are uncomfortable with the label of ‘developing 
country’ and where the EU has larger political interests at stake. In a letter to 
Catherine Ashton, former British Foreign Secretary David Miliband advised the 
Baroness to upgrade the EU’s presence in emerging powers like China, India, 
Indonesia, Brazil, and Pakistan.108 In these countries, the standard and objectives 
resource allocation criteria or DAC-eligibility minimums might prove to be too 
constraining, as the example of Brazil shows. In the CSP for Latin America for 2008-
2013 for instance, the Commission attributed the fact that only 70% of aid was 
DAC-eligible to Brazil claiming the status of an emerging, rather than a 
developing country.109  
 
The reforms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the EEAS 
have inaugurated an interregnum, likely to protract at least until 2013, during which 
the process of institutional engineering will proceed by trial and error, and finally 
settle down. In the short-run, it is likely that the leftovers of DG DEV and AIDCO, 
merged into the newly established DEVCO, and will be the main institutional pivot for 
the development checks and balances, while in the longer-run this responsibility will 
progressively and consciously be assumed by services within the EEAS. 
 
6.  Conclusions: defending the goal of poverty eradication 
 
This paper has investigated whether the fears of many representatives of the 
development community that the emergence of the EEAS will undermine the 
poverty focus of EU development cooperation are justified. To what extent are the 
reforms brought about by the Lisbon Treaty likely to help or hinder the achievement 
of the primary objective of the EU’s development cooperation?  
With the loss of development policy’s independent status, it is likely that the 
objective of poverty eradication, despite the primacy the Treaty accords to it, will 
have to be defended more forcefully than before. The poverty focus of EU 
                                                 
108 A. Rettman, “EU Diplomats Should Target India and China, Ministers Say”, EUObserver, 4 
March 2010, retrieved 5 March 2010, http://euobserver.com/9/29610. 
109 European  Parliament Committee on Development, Report of the European Parliament 
Committee on Development on the Assessment of draft Country and Regional Strategy 
Papers/Indicative Programmes for Brazil, retrieved 25 April 2010, http://www.la-
programming.eu/wcm/dmdocuments/DEVE%20conclusions%20Brazil.pdf 
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development cooperation might be challenged by a competition for resources in 
the 2014-2011 Financial Perspective and, with the creation of single geographical 
desks, by the emergence of a dominant EEAS in the programming cycle and 
preparation of aid regulations. With the Lisbon Treaty, the institutional means to 
transform development cooperation into a component of the EU’s wider foreign-
policy toolbox become available.  
However, as we have shown, the loss of development policy’s independent 
status does not necessarily have to lead to a weakening of the EU’s commitment to 
poverty eradication, provided certain safeguards are in place. To this end, it is key to 
develop an institutional capacity that maintains the system of checks and balances 
of the programming cycle alive and, by consequence, ensures that aid regulations 
reflect a clear focus on poverty eradication. In the short run, it is likely that the 
leftovers of DG DEV and AIDCO, merged into a new DEVCO, will remain the main 
institutional pivot for the development checks and balances, while in the longer run, 
this responsibility will be progressively and consciously assumed by services within the 
EEAS. In this respect, the paper recommends the creation of a development 
department within the EEAS which is directly responsible towards the Commissioner 
for Development and financially accountable to the European Parliament, or 
alternatively an organisational structure in which the Commissioner for Development 
has under his supervision and direct guidance development practitioners within 
several EEAS geographical desks, or the whole of the EEAS geographical desks 
dealing with the full breath of developing countries.  
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